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All flash, no substance? 
Elizabeth Miller 
 
Abstract: The GRW dynamics propose a novel, relevantly “observer”-independent replacement 
for orthodox “measurement”-induced collapse. Yet the tails problem shows that this 
dynamical innovation is not enough: a principled alternative to the orthodox account 
demands some corresponding ontological advancement as well. In fact, there are three 
rival fundamental ontologies on offer for the GRW dynamics. Debate about the relative 
merits of these candidates is a microcosm of broader disagreement about the role of 
ontology in our physical theorizing. According to imprimitivists, the GRW dynamics 
directly describe (only) some (element’s) undulation in an unfamiliar high-dimensional 
physical field. Primitivists resist this GRW0 proposal on the grounds that it fails to secure 
comprehensible contact with our data about macroscopic objects in ordinary low-
dimensional space-time. They expect an adequate fundamental ontology to include at 
least some spatiotemporally localized entities—intuitively, concrete constituents of our 
familiar macroscopic landscape. The most compelling case goes by way of distributional 
basing: minimally, primitivists expect a theory’s predictions immediately about 
spatiotemporal distributions of fundamental entities to provide a supervenience base for 
data about configurations of macroscopic objects. But while the background intuition is 
familiar, the distributional model is surprisingly subtle. Lack of clarity about its details 
generates serious confusion for both sides of our debate. 
 
 
While textbook quantum theory provides a remarkably successful recipe for predicting the 
outcomes of experiments, its standard interpretation rests on gerrymandered dynamics in which 
“observers” making “measurements” play a starring role. This is the price orthodox quantum mechanics 
pays to solve—or, more accurately, evade—the measurement problem (§1).1 GRW’s dynamical 
innovation promises a more principled solution, but a reincarnation of the measurement problem persists 
for GRW (§2). On one view, the tails problem proves that our initial innovation is not enough: we need 
some ontology to go along with our new dynamics.2 In fact, there are three candidates on offer: GRW0, 
GRWm, and GRWf propose three rival fundamental ontologies for the GRW dynamics. Debate about 
 
1 I am deeply grateful to Ned Hall for encouraging me to develop these ideas and for sharing many invaluable insights in 
conversation about them. For further discussion, I am grateful to David Albert and Nina Emery, as well as to the editor of and 
referees for this volume. My thanks also to David Baker, Michael Della Rocca, Heather Demarest, Barry Loewer, Tim Maudlin, 
Mark Maxwell, Michaela McSweeney, Alyssa Ney, Jill North, Zeynep Soysal, Scott Sturgeon, Elanor Taylor, and Alastair 
Wilson; to members of my philosophy of physics seminars at Brown and Yale; and to audiences at the Metro Area Philosophy of 
Science Association (at NYU), the University of Vermont, and USC.  
2 For Maudlin, an ontology is “a collection of items taken to be physically real” by a theory, which can include familiar 
macroscopic objects featuring explicitly in our data but only implicitly in the theory’s own predictions (2013, 143). A theory is 
stated “in terms of” some subset of its ontology so understood. I follow, among others, Allori (2013) and Emery (2017) in describing 
this subset as the theory’s fundamental ontology; for simplicity, though, I drop the ‘fundamental’ where possible. Some instead use 
the label ‘primitive ontology’ for this subset, but since others reserve that for fundamental elements that also meet some further 
condition, I avoid this term here; cf. Dürr, et al. (1992), Maudlin (2013). Still my own label ‘primitivism’ alludes to discussions of 
primitive ontology—as well as to discussions of “spatial primitivism” elsewhere in metaphysics; cf. Chalmers (2012) 325ff. 
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their relative merits is a microcosm of broader disagreement about the role of ontology in our physical 
theorizing.  
One point of dispute is whether an adequate fundamental ontology must or should include some 
“local beables”—physical entities localized “at definite places and times in the real world” (§3).3 Local 
beables play a starring role in our data. Since our antecedent vision of the world features familiar 
macroscopic objects in space-time, any comprehensible theory about our world will be at least indirectly 
about these. Minimally, predictions directly about the features and behaviors of its fundamental ontology 
will provide a supervenience base for facts about “the arrangement of things in ordinary 3-dimensional 
space”. 4 But Bell imposes a further continuity constraint: we must recognize, implicit in these predictions, 
a familiar “image of our physical world”. Since this image features objects in space-time, primitivists expect 
our base itself to include at least some fundamental local beables (or flobs)—intuitively, concrete constituents 
of our macroscopic landscape. On the other side are imprimitivists, who maintain that a theory can do just 
as well, if not better, without any flobs at all.  
In our microcosm, imprimitivists champion GRW0, which takes the GRW dynamics to directly 
describe (only) some (element’s) undulation in a high-dimensional physical field. Primitivists resist GRW0 
on the grounds that it fails to secure adequate contact with our data (§4). The most compelling resistance 
goes by way of prior commitment to distributional basing, which—in Bell’s words—links a “piece of matter” 
from our data to some “galaxy” of constituents within our theory.5 Interestingly, though, recent 
arguments for imprimitivism begin from the premise that distributional basing is a non-starter: even for 
primitivists, (i) a minimal supervenience base must include something besides an occurrent distribution of 
flobs). Imprimitivists focus on showing that (ii) once we add requisite functional or dynamical factors to 
the base, distributional inputs are superfluous: GRW0 can do just as well without any flobs. 
 
3 Bell (1987) 45. 
4 Bell (1987) 44. 
5 Bell (1987) 45. 
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Such a focus obscures two concerns. One is that imprimitivists may prove too much: if (i) and (ii) 
are true, we risk undermining some motivation (reviewed in §§1-2) for turning to ontology in the first 
place. The other, and my primary, concern is that imprimitivists lack an adequate defense of (i). In 
advancing (i), they conflate distributional supervenience with an implausible claim of geometric 
sufficiency. But imprimitivists are not alone in their mistake. A lack of clarity about the details of 
distributional basing generates serious confusion on both sides of our dispute (§5). When it comes to 
recovering Bell’s “image” of our data, it is not enough for primitivists to know it when they see it: before 
we can hope for any further progress, we need careful investigation into their—familiar yet surprisingly 
subtle—model of contact between macroscopic objects and “galaxies” of localized constituents. My aim is 
to highlight the distributional model’s subtlety—and, in light of that, to suggest a path forward in 
disagreement about quantum ontology.    
1 The GRW dynamics  
Start with Schrödinger’s hapless cat, “penned up in a steel chamber”:  
[I]n a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, 
that perhaps in the course of one hour one of the atoms decays…; if it 
happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a 
hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left 
this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives 
if meanwhile no atom has decayed.6  
Schrödinger seals the chamber at t0, expecting one of two outcomes after a tense hour. The textbook 
recipe promises a cat-flask system with one of two wavefunctions, |"dead⟩ or |"alive⟩, when he opens the door 
at t. In the interim, it predicts something even more “diabolical”. Between t0 and t, the theory ascribes 








√2 |"alive⟩ amounts to physically. 
On the other, it seems clear enough what it does not: anything we actually find in our world. Schrödinger 
himself suggests “the living and the dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal 
 
6 Trimmer (1980) 328, translating Schrödinger (1935).  
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parts”, and, in essence, the orthodox interpretation agrees: Schrödinger’s mathematical evolution indicates a 
physical “indeterminacy” only “resolved” by observation.  
More generally, since the textbook recipe frequently yields pre-measurement functions in 
superpositions of relevant eigenstates, its standard interpretation says that systems themselves frequently 
evolve away from familiar physical states. Nevertheless, it does not follow that we should expect to observe 
any unfamiliar happenings. Given pre-measurement state  1√2|"dead⟩	+
1
√2 |"alive⟩, the recipe promises one of 
two familiar eigenstates, each with prior probability | 1√2 |
2=1
2
, at t. Orthodox quantum mechanics tailors its 
physical dynamics to underwrite this guarantee: when Schrödinger opens the chamber, his system’s 
character transforms into either a dead state or a live one. By design, systems evolve away from familiar 
states only when, and indeed because, we are not looking—luckily, though, our data only concerns what the 
world is like when we are.  
An alternative from Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber targets this “measurement”-induced collapse, 
proposing a novel stochastic mechanism in its stead.7 The resulting, unified GRW dynamics yield, as a 
theorem, something close to the orthodox story, thereby cohering with the same empirical data. Crucially, 
though, there is nothing special about observers or measurements per se. Instead, the GRW proposal starts 
with a division of the world into units (particles), each assigned some probability per unit time of 
undergoing a hit event. A hit on a particle transforms the wavefunction representing its position: roughly, 
we can think of a hit centered around some point in space-time as prompting our particle to jump there. 
A larger system’s probability of undergoing a hit-induced transformation is then a function of the number 
of particles interacting within it: a hit on one particle transforms the wavefunction of the whole. 
Schrödinger’s possible outcomes differ with respect to the positions of macroscopically many 
particles: a system in state |"dead⟩ has flask particles strewn across region Rdead of the chamber floor, rather 
than arranged in Ralive. While any single particle will undergo a hit, on average, only once every 108 years, 
we can expect a hit somewhere in our flask—on the order of 1023 particles—every 10-8 seconds.8 The 
 
7 Girardhi, Rimini, and Weber (1986); cf. Albert (1992) 80-116, Albert and Loewer (1996), and Lewis (2006). 
8 Maudlin (2011) 226-8.  
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matched coefficients in 1√2|"dead⟩	+
1
√2 |"alive⟩ indicate that the next hit is just as likely to be centered in Rdead as 
in Ralive, amplifying one of two components. Wavefunctions still spread out between hits, but 
Schrödinger’s system is large enough—and so hits frequent enough—that its spreadings are imperceptibly 
brief. Thanks to our first hit, one of |"dead⟩	 and |"alive⟩ stands amplified at t, and subsequent hits are highly 
likely to reiterate that choice.  
2 The tails problem and fundamental ontology  
GRW’s insight is that anything recognizable as an orthodox “measurement” shares key physical 
characteristics with Schrödinger’s case. Whenever these characteristics are present, stochastic hits 
naturally rein in smeared-out wavefunctions. Importantly, though, these hits do not transform such 
wavefunctions into strict eigenstates. Mathematically, a hit on a particle multiplies its wavefunction by a 
Gaussian, amplifying some component over the rest. But thanks to non-zero “tails” on our multiplying 
curve, such amplification does not eliminate the others. In Schrödinger’s case, a hit takes 1√2|"dead⟩	+
1
√2 |"alive⟩ 
to some function retaining multiple components, say √0.999|"dead⟩ + √0.001|"alive⟩, at t. If our pre-hit function 
was troubling because it was not a plain eigenstate, this tailed post-hit function should be just as bad. The 
natural fix, curtailing the tails, is not a live option: our measurement problem is back with a vengeance, 
just reincarnated in a subtler form.9  
Strictly, the tails problem proves only that GRW’s initial innovation is not enough. We find our 
tailed function troubling because we think it amounts to neither a definitely dead nor definitely live cat. 
Yet this conclusion rests on a further assumption about the relationship between representation and 
reality: a system has a definite “value” for some given “observable” only if its wavefunction is in a strict 
eigenstate of the mathematical operator associated with that observable. We might avert the tails problem 
by revising this link, providing a more sophisticated way of extracting physical outcomes from formal 
representations. Specifically, we need a sort of sophistication that counts √0.999|"dead⟩ + √0.001|"alive⟩  as close 
 
9 In brief, “tailless” collapses threaten the conservation of energy, since they reduce uncertainty about position without any 
compensatory increase in uncertainty about (velocity and so) energy; cf. Albert (1992) 78.  
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enough to |"dead⟩. One option is stipulation: we could propose a mapping between almost eigenstates and 
physical outcomes.10 To provide a principled alternative to the orthodox account, however, GRW needs to 
motivate our close enough verdict.  
A different approach starts by getting serious about quantum ontology.11 Maybe, as Schrödinger 
suggests, mathematical evolution to 1√2|"dead⟩	+
1
√2 |"alive⟩ represents some worldly spreading out or other, but 
what are the entities doing this spreading, what sort of physical processes are involved, and how does any of 
this bear on our data? The eigenstate-eigenvalue link—like any stipulative revision to it—attempts to map 
directly from mathematical representations to the recognizable macroscopic outcomes at issue in our data. 
In doing so, it allegedly skips a crucial step, obscuring the mediating role of ontology in our theorizing. 
Compare a classical case: a candidate theory assigns formal state C to the current contents of my office. It 
also issues predictions about those contents later, assigning mathematically distinct C* to them at t. I leave 
my office, planning to return at t. Should I expect to find the furniture rearranged when I do?  
To answer, it is not enough to know that our theory’s predictions have some bearing on the 
contents of my office. We need to know what its mathematical states directly represent, and how these 
underwriting physical happenings relate to our observable outcomes. In fact, C depicts an arrangement of 
particles in my office. C* depicts another, differing with respect to, say, the relative positions of three 
constituents. Equipped with this ontological insight, we can opine: I should not expect anything new when 
I return. Our distinct mathematical states represent different physical happenings, but so slight a 
difference at the level of particles will not show up in our macroscopic data. In this sense, C* is close enough 
to C: we can recognize Bell’s image of my desk in both. To dissolve the tails problem, we need to issue the 
same sort of verdict: √0.999|"dead⟩ + √0.001|"alive⟩ is close enough to |"dead⟩, since they depict happenings with 
the same (unfortunate) import for our data. For this, we need some new and improved—or at least some, 
reasonably clear—ontology for the GRW dynamics.    
 
10 Albert and Loewer (1996) and Lewis (2006) discuss this strategy. 
11 I learned the term ‘serious ontology’ from John Heil; cf. Heil (2012).  
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3 GRW0 and primitivism  
According to Bell, orthodox disregard for ontology proves especially troubling once we note that 
the wavefunction for my desk, Schrödinger’s flask, or any other macroscopic system “lives in a much 
bigger space” than the one we ordinarily take ourselves to inhabit.12 Perhaps, then, any complete 
interpretive backstory for the textbook recipe will include some physically high-dimensional ingredient(s). 
Regardless, Bell and likeminded primitivists expect it to include at least some flobs in “ordinary 3-
dimensional space” as well. Since science promises us deeper, even revisionary, insight into our world, 
characters in the scientific story may be antecedently unfamiliar to us. Still, they cannot be so unfamiliar 
that we fail to recognize the story as about our world—Bell’s familiar “arrangement of things”—at all.   
GRW0 proposes a thoroughly non-local fundamental ontology for the GRW dynamics. On the 
GRW0 proposal, these dynamics depict (only) some (element’s) undulation in a high-dimensional field, a 
physical counterpart to the mathematical space in which the universal wavefunction resides. Ordinary 
space-time is not a straightforward subspace of this realm: concrete happenings are aspects of, projections 
from, or patterns in some fundamental affairs “outside” of our familiar milieu. GRW0 furnishes a 
complete supervenience basis for our data: we can find some mapping between various high-dimensional 
affairs and familiar macroscopic outcomes.13 According to primitivists, however, this is not enough: 
GRW0 does not afford the right sort of contact with our data: at the very least, some alternative including 
flobs can—and in fact does—do better. 
Before we ask whether √0.999|"dead⟩ + √0.001|"alive⟩ and |"dead⟩ amount to the same outcome, we need 
to recognize both as concerning fundamental happenings that bear, somehow or other, on outcomes here in 
the lab. But why should these particular undulations tell us about the contents of Schrödinger’s chamber 
here, rather than about, say, the furniture in my office, or some distant configuration of elm trees? Not 
because the undulations are here too: GRW0 has no fundamental happenings here—or, indeed, anywhere in 
 
12 Bell (1987) 44. 
13 It is “informationally” complete in the sense of Maudlin (2007a).  
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space-time. Minimally, we need to say which high-dimensional happenings bear on which pieces of data, 
but we started down the road of ontology looking for something better than stipulation.  
Rather than turning back, primitivists urge us to keep going. GRW0 shows that not just any 
ontological ingredients will do: we need at least some flobs in the mix. But not just any localized additions 
will do either. Consider (fictional) GRW0+, which supplements GRW0’s high-dimensional happenings 
with arbitrary flob o. Like GRW0, GRW0+ furnishes at least one supervenience basis for our data. Unlike 
GRW0, it furnishes at least one basis also comprising a localized ingredient(s). Yet o’s addition does not 
secure any relevant advantage over GRW0. Intuitively, o is a mere dangler: while all relevant facts 
supervene on a base including it, they do so only because they already supervene on GRW0’s high-
dimensional happenings alone. Primitivists expect their flobs to play a more essential, distinctive role in 
securing contact with our data.  
Whatever else it may comprise, that data includes facts about the gross configuration of 
macroscopic objects within, or the gross distribution of matter across, space-time. Primitivists expect such 
facts to be fixed entirely by their theory’s predictions just about some underwriting flobs. Our theory may 
bring other—perhaps non-local, even non-spatiotemporal—ingredients along for the ride. Still, these play 
a comparatively indirect role in “determining” our data: in Maudlin’s terms, their effects are “screened off” 
by our “[p]rimary” mediating flobs.14 Intuitively, other fundamental ingredients can causally or physically 
influence these flobs, but they alone directly ground our data.  
For this intuitive distinction to have any bite, primitivists must circumscribe those predictions 
relevantly about their candidate flobs. Otherwise, GRW0+ could count as screening off all our data by 
ascribing some complicated but nominally “local” state—merely represented, in our theory, by the universal 
wavefunction—to o alone. A “Democritean” fix blocks this move: the relevant theoretical predictions 
about primary local beables ascribe (only) spatiotemporal positions to otherwise qualitatively indistinguishable 
 
14 According to Maudlin, “if we imagine keeping the behavior of the Primary Ontology fixed but altering the behavior of the 
Secondary Ontology, the data would remain the same” (2013, 144).  
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elements.15 To make contact with familiar facts about my office, our theory need not explicitly mention 
desks. Still, it should describe at least something here in Roffice, where we antecedently take my desk to be. 
Whatever features this something may or may not turn out to have on our scientific story, it at least should 
be distinguishable from what the theory describes over there in Rempty, where we find no macroscopic 
objects at all.  
Minimally, then, our theory should depict some elements in Roffice without corresponding 
counterparts in Rempty. We can extend this reasoning to smaller scales. Consider the edge of my desk here: 
some materially occupied subregions of Roffice abut comparatively vacant neighbors. This contrast at the 
macroscopic level should show up, somehow or other, as some difference in corresponding contents at the 
level of fundamental ontology. What results is a primitivist paradigm of distributional basing. Rather than 
stipulating some link between this data about the macroscopic configuration of my office and those 
discontinuous fundamental happenings in GRW0, primitivists hope to rely on some antecedently familiar 
continuity between configurations of macroscopic objects and underwriting distributions of concrete 
constituents. Primitivists can disagree amongst themselves about the nature of this continuity, and so 
about further metaphysical or epistemological constraints on the base.16 Minimally, though, they expect 
data about macroscopic configurations to supervene on the theory’s distribution of flobs in space-time.  
4 GRWm and GRWf 
Primitivists are spoiled for choice. There are two alternatives to GRW0, each proposing some 
flobs for the GRW dynamics. But this choice also generates controversy, since even for primitivists, not 
just any localized additions guarantee a relevant advantage over GRW0. Maudlin argues that GRWm 
does not secure the right sort of contact with our data: it does not provide even a minimal distributional 
supervenience base for “the arrangement of things in ordinary 3-dimensional space”. Behind both 
Maudlin’s original argument and Albert’s criticism of it is common confusion about what exactly the 
 
15 Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) 16 n. 18; cf. Ney (2013). Alternatively, we can think of these predictions as ascribing 
fundamental states of “occupation” to points or small regions of space-time itself. 
16 For discussion of candidate constraints, Allori (2013), Ney (2013), and Emery (2017). 
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distributional model demands. 
According to GWRm, reality is not ultimately particulate. Instead, each “particle” from our initial 
presentation of the dynamics gets associated with some portion of continuous mass density. Our dynamics 
now depict evolving distributions of mass density in ordinary space over time: smooth temporal evolution 
of a particle’s wave function corresponds to a spreading out of mass density. What we originally described 
as a particle undergoing a hit centered within a region involves consolidation of associated mass density 
there. As before, a hit on one part of the systems transforms the wavefunction for the whole: Schrödinger’s 
system in state √0.999|"dead⟩ + √0.001|"alive⟩ has much more of its mass density in Rdead than in Ralive. Given 
our transformed coefficients, subsequent hits are likely to consolidate mass density in Rdead, leaving Ralive’s 
shadow to spread and thin. What about the lingering |"alive⟩? Our Gaussian tails guarantee some thin 
smear of mass density in Ralive, but, allegedly, that smear does not show up at the level of our data: our 
tailed function is close enough to |"dead⟩ to yield a familiar outcome.  
Maudlin illustrates his doubts about this last step with the case of a pointer on a dial. If we like, we 
can imagine the pointer’s possible orientations, A and B, representing dead and alive states of 
Schrödinger’s system, but for now just consider the pointer itself: its wavefunction spreads from an initial 
ready state, splitting briefly into 1√2|in RA⟩ + 1√2|in RB⟩, before yielding √0.999|in RA⟩ + √0.001|in RB⟩ at t. Then: 
On the assumption that…[RB’s] small (and ever shrinking) mass density can be safely 
neglected, the post‐hit state [√0.999|in RA⟩ + √0.001|in RB⟩] would be as 
satisfactory in accounting for our beliefs about the outcome as it is in the case 
of predictive certainty [|in RA⟩].  
But on what basis, exactly, can the small mass density be neglected? After 
all, that mass density is something, and it has the same shape and…behavior 
and dispositions to behave as it would have had if the hit had left it with the 
lion’s share of mass density. 17      
Our data includes one pointer at A, with no macroscopic counterpart at B, but GRWm depicts two 
portions of mass density.  
According to Maudlin, these portions match in all relevant respects, even at t. Indeed, the actual 
distribution of mass density across both RA and RB matches, in all such respects, what we would find in the 
 
17 Maudlin (2010) 135; his emphasis.  
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case of √0.001|in RA⟩ + √0.999|in RB⟩. Of course, RB’s actual mass density is supposed to be too thin to 
amount to a macroscopic object, but on what “basis” can we discount it? In principle, we might introduce 
some concentration threshold: only RA contains any recognizable distribution of portions with thickness 
greater than ρ at t. If we stipulate some value for ρ, however, we risk undermining our motivation for 
introducing flobs in the first place: GRW0 can just as well stipulate some mapping between its 
discontinuous fundamental happenings and macroscopic outcomes.  
Albert and likeminded imprimitivists share Maudlin’s risk assessment, but they embrace this 
consequence for GRW0. They take Maudlin’s case to point to a deeper problem with primitivism itself. 
According to Albert, familiar objects are distinguished, in part, by characteristic behaviors and 
dispositions. As a result, everyone, even primitivists, must accept: (i) an adequate basis for our data will 
specify more than the occurrent distribution of fundamental ontology. Albert takes Maudlin’s reference to 
“behavior and dispositions to behave” to mark his own explicit acceptance of (i). On Albert’s diagnosis, a 
confused fixation with distributional factors gets in the way: Maudlin implicitly expects “whatever is shaped 
like” a pointer to be a pointer, and so mistakenly assumes that his similarly shaped portions of mass density 
have the same dispositions at t.18 Thanks to the GRW dynamics, only Maudlin’s thicker portion is actually 
disposed to consolidate—its thinner counterpart is likely to spread and fade.  
According to Albert, the same sort of confusion lying behind Maudlin’s error in this case is also 
what motivates primitivists’ attachment to fundamental local beables in the first place. Primitivists fail to 
appreciate (i), because they overemphasize distributional considerations. If we take (i) to heart, though, we 
find that GRW0 can do just as well as its rivals. That is: (ii) once we have functional information in the 
base, distributional facts are, at best, superfluous.19 It is precisely because of (ii), however, that primitivists 
should not, and Maudlin plausibly does not, grant (i) to begin with: primitivists hope to secure an 
advantage over GRW0 by providing a distributional basis.  
As Maudlin observes, even if we need further factors to distinguish those distributions that 
 
18 Albert (2015) 151. 
19 Cf. Rubenstein (forth.).  
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amount to genuine pointers from mere pointer-like objects, such functionalism is beside the point in his case: 
pointer or not, GRWm depicts “something” macroscopic in RB. Muddying the waters throughout Albert 
and Maudlin’s exchange are their differing uses of the term ‘disposition’. Albert and his fellow 
imprimitivists are concerned with causal or functional dispositions. Yet Maudlin instead seems to have in 
mind the “arrangement, order; [or] relative position of the parts or elements of a whole”.20 In comparing 
“dispositions” in his sense, then, Maudlin is quite plausibly affirming his commitment to distributional 
basing. After all, he rejects GRWm because he thinks it fails to mark any requisite difference in the 
arrangements of flobs across RA and RB.  
Maudlin’s own response is to swap GRWm’s continuous mass density for GRWf’s discrete event 
ontology. The physical correlate of a hit centered around some point in space-time is now a “flash” there. 
Our matched weights in 1√2|in RA⟩ + 1√2|in RB⟩ signify that RA and RB are equally likely to host the next flash. 
In fact, a hit in RA takes us to √0.999|in RA⟩ + √0.001|in RB⟩ at t. Our transformed coefficients indicate that 
the next flash is highly likely (probability .999) to be in RA as well. The GRW dynamics ensure that 
further hits are likely to reiterate this choice. Crucially, no shadows haunt GRWf: where GRWm looks at 
√0.999|in RA⟩ + √0.001|in RB⟩ and posits a thin but sure smear of mass density in RB, GRWf posits only some 
probability of a flash—and then a cascade of flashes—there. But probabilities of flashes are neither flashes 
nor pointers nor shadows of these. Our tailed function is close enough to an eigenstate: √0.999|in RA⟩ +
√0.001|in RB⟩ depicts a galaxy in RA—and none in RB.  
5 Massy gluts and flashy gaps 
Since GRWf has “no ‘low density’ or ‘low intensity’ flash‐sequences to be ignored or discounted 
or argued away”, Maudlin takes it to avoid the “interpretive problems” that stymie GRWm.21 Yet 
GRWf’s comparative sparseness also ensures that, sometimes, GRWf has mere probabilities where 
 
20 OED online (2020); thanks to Maudlin (p.c.) for confirming. Compare Maudlin’s characterization of the Humean mosaic as 
“determined by nothing more than the values of the individual pixels plus their spatial disposition relative to one another…” 
(2007b, 51), and his claim that (for our primitivists) “the disposition of the local ontology screens off the quantum state from the 
data” (2013, 148).  
21 Maudlin (2010) 138-9. 
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GRWm has sure non-shadowy mass. On the GRWf account, wavefunctions underdetermine occurrent 
distributions of flashes. Given √0.999|in RA⟩ + √0.001|in RB⟩ at t, we can expect another flash in RA very 
shortly. Still, its actual occurrence is determined by GRW’s stochastic dynamics. In the interim, however 
brief, we have no flashes at all in RA. Indeed, if flashes are truly instantaneous, then GRWf promises many 
entirely empty moments, amid some barely flashy accompaniment. GRWf virtually guarantees some 
unfolding cascade in RA, but it does not promise a multi-flash galaxy at any moment. Where GRWm has 
some sure, thick mass density in RA, GRWf offers—if we are lucky—a single flash.  
Flashy gaps generate a challenge for GRWf analogous to the challenge shadowy mass density 
generates for GRWm. One potential objection to GRWm starts from 1√2|in RA⟩ + 1√2|in RB⟩, before our initial 
hit in Maudlin’s case: we have two exactly matched portions of mass density at time t-. But this cannot be 
a basis on which to prefer GRWf, because it is in the same boat: 1√2|in RA⟩ + 1√2|in RB⟩ depicts two equally 
vacant distributions of flashes at t-. In fact, the situation for GRWf is worse: √0.999|in RA⟩ + √0.001|in RB⟩ at t 
likely depicts two vacant distributions after our hit as well.  
Since Maudlin takes GRWf to avoid the “interpretive problems” that plague GRWm, the image 
of our data need not comprise some single pointer-shaped distribution of flobs at t. Our data concerns 
humanly detectable happenings, so perhaps what we need is a recognizable distribution across some 
suitably extended temporal interval. One option is to link RA’s momentary state to some broader 
distribution of flobs. Another is to deny that there are any momentary macroscopic states at all: our data 
concerns configurations spread over space and time. Either way, once we shift our attention to an 
extended interval, we can find a difference in the decorations of RA and RB. But we also find at least some 
difference between GRWm’s portions of mass density: though 1√2|in RA⟩ +
1
√2|in RB⟩ depicts a momentary 
match, the contents of RB soon spread and fade.  
For Maudlin, of course, this is not the right sort of difference to underwrite our macroscopic data: 
thick or thin, GRWm still predicts “something” in RB, even after our hit. His remark might seem to suggest 
that GRWf, unlike GRWm, satisfies the following condition: a region of space is macroscopically vacant 
only if there are no flobs in it during some relevant interval. Even in the classical case, though, we learn that 
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“empty” space is not devoid of occupants. In a large enough region, a single flash, or even some sparse 
scattering of flashes, does not suffice for anything macroscopic at all. Instead, perhaps the claim is that for 
any relevant region of space-time R, R is macroscopically vacant only if there is no recognizably shaped 
distribution of flobs there. Even after our first hit, GRWm retains two recognizably pointer-shaped 
distributions, only one of which is thick enough to be a genuine macroscopic object. According to 
Maudlin, GRWm needs some basis on which to discount some recognizably shaped distributions as 
macroscopically inconsequential. In contrast, perhaps any recognizably pointer-shaped galaxy of flashes 
amounts to something macroscopic for GRWf.  
While our choice between continuous and discrete ontologies can obscure this point, GRWf’s 
appearance of an advantage arises from ambiguity in such talk of shape. Trace the outline of Maudlin’s 
distribution of mass density in RA over some interval. Now imagine filling in this outline with flashes. How 
many flashes does it take to yield a recognizably pointer-shaped distribution? Perhaps any distribution 
“consistent” with our outline—even just one flash within this boundary—counts as pointer-shaped in some 
minimal sense. But not every distribution that counts as pointer-shaped in this sense does—or should—
amount to a genuine macroscopic object. Perhaps Maudlin has some more robust notion in mind: a 
relevantly pointer-shaped distribution of flashes is not only minimally consistent with our outline but also 
sufficiently clustered to show up in our data. But then GRWf and GRWm are in the same boat: both must 
distinguish some special, sufficiently concentrated candidates from among all minimally pointer-shaped ones.  
Perhaps this result offers Albert a way of shoring up his case for (i): GRWf and GRWm are in the 
same boat, because neither has any advantage over GRW0. On Albert’s diagnosis, implicit commitment 
to geometric sufficiency motivates primitivists’ attachment to local beables. As Maudlin himself points out, 
however, GRWm violates this condition. Since GRWf is in the same boat, it does too: On what basis can 
either one discount insufficiently concentrated distributions? According to Albert, the right response is to 
give up on the expectation of distributional basing: even primitivists must agree that we need more than the 
occurrent distribution of fundamental ontology in the base. But then GRW0 can do just as well without 
any localized fundamental ontology at all.  
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Alternatively, maybe GRWf and GRWm are in the same boat because both offer a relevant 
advantage over GRW0. According to Maudlin, GRWf does better than GRW0. If GRWm is in the same 
boat, then—despite his own suspicions to the contrary—it does too. To defend this alternative, primitivists 
must separate distributional basing from any implausible claim of geometric sufficiency. Recall our 
primitivists’ motivation for introducing fundamental local beables in the first place: roughly, they hope to 
link macroscopic configurations to arrangements of localized constituents (§3). Our data includes a single 
macroscopic pointer, at A, over some relevant interval. The tip of our pointer extends through small 
region RA1, while some neighbor R is (comparatively) empty. Primitivists expect our theory to predict at 
least some flobs in RA1 without any counterparts in R. Still, more flobs in RA1 is consistent with some—
sparser—flobs in R.  
In Maudlin’s case, though, GRWm does mark this sort of distributional difference, even between 
his similarly shaped portions of mass density. To make the parallel with GRWf vivid, imagine GRWm’s 
mass density packaged in thin layers: mass density gets “painted on” a region in a series of discrete strokes. 
We can have some difference in distributions—whether massy “strokes” or flashes—across RA and RB, 
without any difference in “shape” per se. Neither GRWf nor GRWm counts every minimally pointer-shaped 
distribution as a macroscopic object—but nor should they. The key question for primitivists is whether 
this result demotes both to the level of stipulation or, alternatively, whether both preserve continuity that 
secures their alleged advantage over GRW0. Primitivists expect at least minimal (“global”) supervenience 
between our data and spatiotemporal distributions of flobs.22 Intuitively, they expect a special link 
between our data about one part of the world and some distribution in that part. To make progress, 
though, primitivists need to clarify what exactly, beyond minimal supervenience, their model demands.  
GRWf’s sparseness underscores this need. For whatever exactly distributional continuity comes 
to, the distribution of flobs just within a region does not, in general, metaphysically suffice for its 
 
22 Cf. Kim (1987). A referee asks how distributional supervenience relates to Humean supervenience (HS). There is much more to 
say, but prima facie, primitivists can remain neutral on HS, which claims supervenience for all facts about the world, including 
causal and nomological facts, not just facts about macroscopic configurations. Cf. Maudlin (2007b), Miller (2018). 
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macroscopic state on the GRWf account. For small regions, this result is unsurprising: it is just the spatial 
analogue of our earlier point about temporal sparseness. While there is a pointer in RA through some 
interval, subregion RA* may well contain no flashes at all. So, if RA* counts as macroscopically occupied at 
all, it is because of some distribution extending beyond its bounds. But now consider larger RA: this hosts 
the broader distribution D that, intuitively, makes up our pointer at A. Perhaps within our actual world, 
any flashy duplicate of D amounts to something macroscopic. Yet consider another (near) world w, which 
hosts some duplicate of D in much flashier surroundings. Does this—indeed, should this—duplicate 
amount to any macroscopic object? Surely, it depends: not if even “empty” space is densely decorated in 
w. In that case, after all, D is not even recognizably pointer-shaped in anything but our minimal sense. 
Plausibly, in fact, any relevant further sense is essentially contrastive: what it takes to be sufficiently dense, in 
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